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Owen M. Fiss:
The Influence of His Pre-Legal Education
MORTON J. HORWITZ*
I first met Owen almost exactly 50 years ago at Stuyvesant High
School in New York City. We spent many hours during the next four
years at a nearby luncheonette, arguing about whether capitalism and
democracy were compatible. Our paths somewhat diverged when Owen
left for Dartmouth in 1955, but we continued to stay in touch, even dur-
ing Owen's two years at Oxford, 1959-61.
Later, as I read Owen's scholarly output, I was immediately struck
by the close connection of some of his scholarship to the ideas he had
already encountered during his pre-legal education. I suspect that no
one else (perhaps not even Owen) is in as good a position to sketch the
intellectual roots of some of his most important contributions to legal
scholarship.
In his recent biography of Winston Churchill, Roy Jenkins illus-
trated what he called "the frailty of reminiscent memory" with the story
of a meeting between Churchill and Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia near
the end of the Second World War. Jenkins reported:
Churchill ... moved into a reminiscent mood, telling Tito how thirty-
one years before he had visited the Dalmatian coast in the Admiralty
yacht with Asquith and how politics had been mentioned only once
"during the forty days on tour."
Then Jenkins added: "[T]he cruise lasted only nineteen days, and ...
Asquith's main complaint had been that Churchill never talked about
anything but politics."1
Reading this, just as I was drafting this paper, led me, out of an
excess of caution, to telephone Owen to check on facts that I was abso-
lutely sure I had remembered correctly. "Owen," I began, "you read
Laski and T.H. Green at Oxford, right?" "No," Owen replied, "I read
them at Dartmouth." I then asked, "But didn't you do your Oxford
paper on G.D.H. Cole?" "No," Owen replied, "that was also at
Dartmouth. At Oxford, I wrote on H.L.A. Hart's Rule of Recognition."
So Owen proceeded to tell me about a part of his education that I
either had not known or remembered. The gist of the story is that Owen
studied these thinkers in his senior year at Dartmouth, not at Oxford.
* Charles Warren Professor of the History of American Law, Harvard Law School.
1. Roy JENKINS, CHURCHILL: A BIOGRAPHY 753 (2001).
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His mentor there was H. Gordon Skilling, a Rhodes scholar from
Canada, who had studied socialist thought in England, but was soon to
be terminated as Dartmouth College made its own contribution to the
McCarthy Era.2 Another influence was Professor Arthur Wilson, later
the distinguished biographer of Diderot,3 with whom Owen wrote his
senior thesis on the British Labor Historian G.D.H. Cole.
There are at least two major themes in Owen's work that I believe
can easily be traced to his pre-legal education. First is his 1976 Philoso-
phy and Public Affairs article on groups, which carries forward the ideas
about the social reality as well as autonomy of groups put forth by the
so-called English Pluralists, and in particular, Harold Laski and G.D.H.
Cole.4 Second is his work on freedom of expression. In its refusal to
accept the classical distinction between positive and negative liberty,
Owen's work reveals not only the affirmative influence of T.H. Green
but also the negative challenge posed to Owen by Isaiah Berlin's Two
Concepts of Liberty, which had appeared just two years before Owen
studied with Berlin at Oxford.5
The 1976 article, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, was
written mid-way between two of the Supreme Court's most important
decisions on affirmative action, DeFunis v. Odegaard (1974)6 and
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978).7 The article
was designed to intervene in the debate unleashed by DeFunis about the
constitutionality of affirmative action for African-Americans. But the
article is remembered particularly for its argument that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause "recognizes the existence and importance of groups, not just
individuals."8  It has been cited nearly four hundred times in law
reviews, not to speak of books or non-legal journals. Owen wrote:
There are natural classes, or social groups, in American society and
blacks are such a group. Blacks are viewed as a group; they view
themselves as a group; their identity is in large part determined by
membership in the group; their social status is linked to the status of
the group; and much of our action, institutional and personal, is based
2. H. Gordon Skilling joined the Dartmouth faculty in 1947. As a Rhodes scholar in
England in 1934, Skilling temporarily joined the British Communist Party. At Dartmouth, in the
late 1950s, Skilling was denied promotion and briefly lost his green card. He left Dartmouth in
1959 for the University of Toronto, where he founded the Centre for Russian and East European
Studies. See H. GORDON SKILLING, THE EDUCATION OF A CANADIAN: My LIFE AS A SCHOLAR
AND ACTIVIST ( 2000).
3. ARTHUR M. WILSON, DIDEROT (2000).
4. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. At'e. 107 (1976).
5. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY: AN INAUGURAL LECTURE DELIVERED
BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD (1958).
6. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
7, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
8. Fiss, supra note 4, at 136.
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on these perspectives.9
Interestingly, at this point Owen drops a lengthy footnote referring
to "an earlier legal literature on groupism,"' without ever mentioning
either the earlier English literature, which he knew, nor the not-yet-well-
recognized work of the American group pluralists Horace Kallen or
Felix Cohen."
In 1986, Owen came to the end of a long collaboration with the son
of his deceased and beloved former colleague, Harry Kalven, which
resulted in publication of Kalven's A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of
Speech in America.'2 That year, in the Iowa Law Review, Owen
announced the imminent publication of the book and declared that the
"Worthy Tradition" of free speech that Kalven identified "is flawed in
some important respects." 3 His concerns, he wrote, "first arose in the
seventies - one of the few periods when America wondered out loud
whether capitalism and democracy were compatible."' 4 This may be
another example of Jenkins' "frailty of reminiscent memory"' 5 - I
recall that we argued about nothing else in the fifties. But maybe it was
not quite "out loud" during the McCarthy Era.
In any event, Owen traced his recent concern with the compatibility
of capitalism and democracy, first to the events around Watergate, cul-
minating in the Campaign Reform Act of 1974.16 These events led him,
he said, to realize "how thoroughly economic power had begun to cor-
rupt our politics.' 7 A second influence was the 1977 publication of
Charles Lindbloom's book Politics and Markets,'8 which, in Owen's
words, "tried to show, that, contrary to classical democratic theory,
politics was not an autonomous sphere of activity, but was indeed
shaped and controlled by the dominant economic interests."' 9
Finally, Owen focused on recent First Amendment decisions in
9. Id. at 148.
10. Id. at 149 n.65.
11. For a discussion of Kallen, see JOHN HIGHAM, SEND THESE TO ME: IMMIGRANTS IN
URBAN AMERICA 205-15 (1984). For a discussion of Cohen, see DALIA TSUK, ENCOUNTERS WITH
PLURALISM: THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF FELIX S. COHEN (forthcoming); Dalia Tsuk, Pluralisms:
The Indian New Deal as a Model, 1 MARGINS 393 (2001).
12. HARRY KALVEN, A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA (Jamie Kalven
ed., 1988).
13. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1406 (1986).
14. Id.
15. JENKINS, supra note 1, at 753
16. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(1974).
17. Fiss, supra note 13, at 1406.
18. CHARLES E. LINDBLOOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL ECONOMIC
SYSTEMS (1977).
19. Fiss, supra note 13, at 1406.
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which, as he put it, "the Supreme Court was faced with a number'of
cases that required it to examine the relationship of political and eco-
nomic power."' 20 The cases ranged from challenges to the Fairness Doc-
trine2 in broadcasting; to attacks on campaign reform legislation in
Buckley 22 and Belloti;2 3 to restrictions on First Amendment rights in
Prune Yard Shopping Center.4
Owen noted that his "first inclination" was to see these decisions as
"involving a conflict between liberty and equality."25 But he concluded
that "[o]n reflection ... the problem seemed deeper and more compli-
cated. I saw that at issue was not simply a conflict between equality and
liberty, but also and more importantly, a conflict between two concep-
tions of liberty. The battle being fought was not just Liberty v. Equality,
but Liberty v. Liberty, or to put the point another way, not just between
the first amendment and the equal protection clause, but a battle within
the first amendment itself."26
Both in Groups and the Equal Protection Clause7 and in his work
on freedom of expression, Owen has returned to themes that he first
encountered in his pre-legal education almost a half century ago.
From the work of Harold Laski and G.D.H. Cole, he learned the
English pluralist argument for the autonomy and separate identity of
groups. At the beginning of a decade of writing on the subject of sover-
eignty and groups, Laski declared in the Harvard Law Review: "When
the history of associations ... comes to be written, one clear generaliza-
tion as to its tenour during the nineteenth century will be admitted: the
courts have been in practice increasingly compelled to approximate its
position to that of an ordinary individual. 2 8
Cole, the subject of Owen's senior thesis, put forth a conception of
guild socialism organized around self-governing workers' guilds that
was designed to counter the centralistic thrust of orthodox Marxism. His
work emphasized the social reality of group life, especially epitomized
by his history of English trade unions.29
From T.H. Green, Owen first learned that nineteenth century Liber-
alism was locked in an historically anachronistic idea of negative liberty.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1406-07.
22. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
23. First Nat'l Bank v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
24. Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
25. Fiss, supra note 13, at 1407.
26. Id.
27. Fiss, supra note 4.
28. Harold J. Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HARV. L. Rav. 404 (1916).
29. G.D.H. COLE, AN INTRODUCTION TO TRADE UNIONISM (1953); G.D.H. COLE, A HISTORY
OF SOCIALIST THOUGHT (1953).
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He probably read T.H. Green's famous statement in Liberal Legislation
and Freedom of Contract that "[I]f the ideal of true freedom is the maxi-
mum of power for all members of human society alike to make the best
of themselves, we are right in refusing to ascribe the glory of freedom to
a state in which the apparent elevation of the few is founded on the
degradation of the many."30 With his notion of positive freedom as "that
equal development of the faculties of all which is the highest good for
all,"3 Green was attempting to show that it was possible to reform Lib-
eralism from within and thereby to transform it into a system that could
legitimate the Welfare State.3"
The final step in Owen's early intellectual journey was his encoun-
ter with the powerful mind and personality of Isaiah Berlin, with whom
he studied at Oxford and whose enormously influential essay, Two Con-
cepts of Liberty, had recently been published.33 The gist of Berlin's
arguments was that a positive concept of liberty inevitably degenerated
into coercive totalitarianism, "forcing people to be free" in that much
misinterpreted Rousseauian phrase. It was, in fact, a challenge to every-
thing Owen had learned at Dartmouth. We see his resolution of that
conflict twenty-five years later in his Iowa piece, in which he emphati-
cally rejects an exclusively negative idea of liberty.34
Owen's intellectual journey has many lessons. I do think it illus-
trates the prominence - indeed, the staying power - in a person's
intellectual evolution of important ideas learned for the first time in
one's youth. However, it also has an important message for those who
study Anglo-American intellectual history. Most of the ideas that Owen
encountered in his senior year at Dartmouth were largely unavailable in
the intellectual climate of the 1950s. The Princeton historian Carl
Schorske has written of the general "intellectual situation" he encoun-
tered in America during the 1950s:
In the fields of greatest importance to my concern - literature,
politics, art history, philosophy - scholarship in the 1950's was
turning away from history as its basis for self-understanding. At the
same time, in a parallel movement, the several academic disciplines
redefined their intellectual functions in ways that weakened their
30. 3 T.H. GREEN, Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract, in WORKS 365, 372 (1891).
For more discussion of Green's political thought, see JAMEs T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN
VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT 30-
34 (1986).
31. Id.
32. For more discussion of Green's political thought, see JAMES T. KLOPPENBERO,
UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN
THOUGHT 30-34 (1986).
33. See BERLIN, supra note 5.
34. See Fiss, supra note 13.
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social relatedness. Thus, for example, the New Critics in literature,
as they came to power in the academy, replaced practitioners of liter-
ary historicism who had prevailed in English departments before
World War II with scholars committed to an a-temporal, internalistic,
formal analysis. In political science, as the New Deal receded, the
normative concerns of traditional political philosophy and the prag-
matic preoccupation with questions of public policy began to give
way to the a-historical and politically neutralizing reign of the
behaviorists. In economics, mathematically oriented theorists
expanded their dominion at the expense alike of the older, socially
minded institutionalists and of policy-oriented Keynesians. Even in
such a field as music, a new cerebrality inspired by Schoenberg and
Schenker began to erode musicology's historical concerns. Above all
in philosophy, a discipline previously marked by a high conscious-
ness of its own historical character and continuity, the analytic school
challenged the validity of the traditional questions that had concerned
philosophers since antiquity. In the interest of a restricted purer func-
tioning in the areas of language and logic, the new philosophy broke
the ties both to history in general and to the discipline's past."
We can take the reception of John Rawls' work as a rough marker
for the revival of political philosophy in America. The widening influ-
ence of Rawls' work occurred at about the same time as graduate study
was finally becoming available in social or political philosophy. Rawls
published the complete version of Justice as Fairness in 1958.36 How-
ever, it did not appear in collections of essays until the early sixties. His
book, A Theory of Justice, did not appear until 197 1.37
Before the late sixties or early seventies, the subject matter of
Owen's Dartmouth studies would have been unavailable in most elite
American universities. The powerful influence of McCarthyism fed into
the rise of an apolitical analytical philosophy to virtually eliminate
social and political philosophy from the legitimate subject matter of phi-
losophy. And, of course, Owen reports that the unusual person who
actually taught him these things at Dartmouth, his mentor, H. Gordon
Skilling, was himself soon to become a victim of McCarthyism.
35. CARL E. SCHORSKE, FIN-DE-SIECLE VIENNA: POLITICS AND CULTURE (1981).
36. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 PHIL. REV. 164 (1958).
37. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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